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das mit dem ‘Wortlaut’, das ginge nicht la¨nger mehr
— Theodor Fontane, Der Stechlin
The normative use of the Church Fathers and the theologi approbati, who were
among the most important auctoritates next to the Scriptures, demonstrates
that late-medieval theologians were faithful to tradition. This predilection
for tradition was affirmed by, and institutionalized in, the university, where
a fixed list of texts was read and commented upon across generations.1
While other disciplines also showed a tendency toward traditionalism,
late-medieval theologians relied heavily on the traditional thinking that
rested on the basic principle of a science dealing with God. That is, the
source of theology should be found in divine revelation and divinely in-
spired tradition rather than any sort of human imagination.2
The tenet that religious truth must be derived from revelation and
tradition alone did not, however, prevent medieval theology from being
subject to a process of radical change, one in which new methods of thinking
about the divine and its creation were developed. Such novel methods were
motivated by new methodologies in the fields of grammar and logic and, in
the fourteenth century, also of mathematics and physics.3
1. The medieval notion of auctoritas and the use of a fixed list of texts is discussed
in L. M. de Rijk, La Philosophie au Moyen-Age (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985), pp. 82–105.
As to the educational system, see J. Hamesse, ed., Manuels, Programmes de Cours et
Techniques d’Enseignement dans les Universite´s Medie´vales (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut
d’E´tudes Me´die´vales de l’Universite´ Catholique de Louvain, 1994).
2. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Pars 1, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2: “argumentari
ex auctoritate est maxime proprium huius doctrinae (sc. sacrae doctrinae), eo quod
principia huius doctrinae per revelationem habentur.”
3. Cf. L. Valente, Phantasia contrarietatis. Contraddizioni scritturali, discorso teo-
logico e arti del linguaggio nel De tropis loquendi di Pietro Cantore ( †1197) (Firenze: Leo S.
Olschki Editore, 1997), esp. the extensive bibliography; and C. Marmo, ed., Vestigia,
Imagines, Verba. Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XIIth–XIVth Century)
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These changes forced theologians to reflect on the nature and status
of their discipline, especially with regard to the sources to be used and to
the methods by which they were to be read and understood.4 This prob-
lem touches on vocabulary and methodology, which cannot reasonably be
treated in sufficient detail here. I will thus limit myself to the discussion of
the concept of virtus sermonis, which played an important role in the debate
over scientific methodology, and to focus on the tension between tradition
and logical techniques.5
The concept of virtus sermonis is understood to mean that which is
properly intended by a word or words, with two possible interpretations as
to where the proper intention comes from: the standard use of logic or
the intention of the speaker. In the everyday pattern of speech the two will
generally coincide; however, in the case of theology, they often differ. The
Scriptures speak about God metaphorically and do not always use words
according to their common meaning. Like their sources, theologians often
do the same. The proper meaning of a word is thus changed, according to
the intention of the author, who adapts his language to render intelligible
those things that are difficult to understand.6
In the fourteenth century, the use of the concept of virtus sermonis or
vis sermonis increased significantly, due to developments in the field of logic
that induced theologians to reflect on the meaning of words and on the
truth of propositions. By the mid-fourteenth century, a growing interest in
tradition became apparent, which was expressed through the use of both
Augustine and Anselm’s works and the increased pursuit of an adherence
to the communis opinio theologorum.7
(Turnhout: Brepols, 1997). Interesting observations concerning the fourteenth cen-
tury can also be found in W. J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century
England (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
4. Still very useful on the subject are A. Lang, Die Entfaltung des apologetischen
Problems in der Scholastik des Mittelalters (Freiburg: Herder, 1962); and Lang, Die theo-
logische Prinzipienlehre der mittelalterlichen Scholastik (Freiburg: Herder, 1964). See also
U. Ko¨pf, Die Anfa¨nge der theologischen Wissenschaftstheorie im 13. Jahrhundert (Beitra¨ge
zur historischen Theologie, 49) (Tu¨bingen: Mohr, 1974); and G. R. Evans, The Lan-
guage and Logic of the Bible: The Road to Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985).
5. On the notion of virtus sermonis, see W. J. Courtenay, Force of Words and Figures
of Speech: The Crisis over virtus sermonis in the Fourteenth Century, Franciscan Studies 44
(1984): 107–28; and Z. Kaluza, “Les sciences et leurs langages. Note sur le statut
du 29 de´cembre 1340 et le pre´tendu statut perdu contre Ockham,” in Filosofia e
teologia nel trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi, ed. L. Bianchi (Louvain-la-Neuve:
Federation Internationale des Instituts d’Etudes Medievales, 1994), pp. 197–258.
6. Evans, Language and Logic, pp. 51–65.
7. On the growing influence of Augustine, see H. A. Oberman, Werden und
Wertung der Reformation (Tu¨bingen: Mohr, 1979), 82–140. See also L. Grane, A.
Schindler, M. Wriedt, eds., Auctoritas patrum. Zur Rezeption der Kirchenva¨ter im 15. und
16. Jahrhundert (Mainz: Von Zabern, 1993); and L. Grane, A. Schindler, M. Wriedt,
eds., Auctoritas patrum II. Neue Beitra¨ge zur Rezeption der Kirchenva¨ter im 15. und 16.
Jahrhundert (Mainz: Von Zabern, 1998).
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These two movements were not independent of each other. The study
of logic and the reading of traditional authors made the difference between
the two evident. Traditional texts appeared not always to have been written
according to the rules of logic. In fact, there seemed to be a gap between
the languages of logic and tradition. However, without doubting the truth
of logic, most theologians sided with the communis opinio theologorum. The
rules of logic remained generally accepted, but, in theology, they had to give
way to tradition whenever the two came into opposition.8
Marsilius of Inghen, to whom this article is devoted, provides a striking
case in point. He was well-versed in logic and contributed significantly to
its development, using his logical skills also in his theological writings. At
the same time, he was sensitive to tradition. He worked in a period when
originality and individuality were disappearing from theology, giving way to
school adherence and traditionalism. As theological practice became more
and more important, theoretical skills were no longer used for discovering
new things; rather, they were deployed for clarifying and justifying tradi-
tional knowledge. The latter point is evident from the sources Marsilius
refers to in his commentary on the Sentences, his most important theological
writing. Next to Adam Wodeham, Robert Holcot, and Gregory of Rimini,
Marsilius quoted extensively from Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas,
and Bonaventure, authors who gained authority as doctores famosi in the sec-
ond half of the fourteenth century. On several occasions, he also stated
that he would not go against tradition. He thought that other theologians
had pushed the matter too far in their application of logic to theology. On
Marsilius’s view, though such theologians might have held positions ruled
true according to logic, their positions ran counter to tradition; therefore,
such positions should not have been put forward without further explana-
tion, since they might offend those outside the university.9
This fear of disturbing ordinary believers returns us to the concept of
virtus sermonis. Marsilius used the term virtus sermonis to mean the intention
of a word as it is applied in logic but which may, at times, differ from its
application in theology, where it may cause confusion and embarrassment.10
8. Cf. M. H. Shank, Unless You Believe, You Shall Not Understand: Logic, University,
and Society in Late Medieval Vienna (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). An
interesting case is Robert Holcot, who held at some point of his career the opinion
that the rules of Aristotelian logic were not applicable in the supernatural order. On
this, see H. G. Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason: Three Questions on the Nature
of God by Robert Holcot OP (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983),
pp. 26–28.
9. On the different aspects of Marsilius’s thinking, see M. J. F. M. Hoenen
and P. Bakker, eds., Philosophie und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters. Marsilius von
Inghen und das Denken seiner Zeit (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000).
10. As will appear from the discussion below, for Marsilius, the virtue of speech
was determined by the personal supposition of the terms of the proposition, not by
the intention of the author. See also E. P. Bos, ed., Marsilius of Inghen: Treatises on the
Properties of Terms. A First Critical Edition of the Suppositiones, Ampliationes, Appellationes,
Restrictiones and Alienationes (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983), pp. 78, 205.
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The same understanding of the concept can be found in contemporary
writings, such as in Peter of Ailly’s Tractatus ex parte universitatis and John
Gerson’s Octo regulae. Both treatises were directed against heretical opinions,
which, by virtue of speech, were true, but which might lead to heresy. As such,
they needed to be condemned.11
Marsilius’s concern was not the condemnation of opinions. His com-
mentary on the Sentences had a different character. It shows how in the late
medieval period, at the newly founded University of Heidelberg, a lecturer
on the Sentences trained in logic tried to cope with the conflict between logic
and tradition.
Two examples from his commentary, both concerning the Trinity, are
worthy of close examination. In the history of theology, discussion of the
Trinity often proved problematic; it claimed the unity of the divine essence
to be identical with the three divine persons, which seemed to contradict
sound reasoning. Because of its difficult nature, the topic represented a sig-
nificant challenge to logic. The development of supposition theory and the
discussion over the nature of the syllogism in the medieval period resulted
partly from this challenge.12
Marsilius deals extensively with logical problems that arise in ques-
tions concerning the Trinity, using the notion of virtus sermonis repeat-
edly. First, I will analyze a passage that shows which logical tools Marsilius
employed, and how they were linked to the concept of virtus sermonis.
This will provide the foundation for the discussion of another part of his
work, where he engaged in a problem that had already been elaborated by
Robert Holcot and Adam Wodeham, namely the dilemma of whether the
11. Peter of Ailly, Tractatus ex parte universitatis studii Parisiensis pro causa Fidei
contra quemdam fratrem Johannem de Montesono, in Ch. du Plessis d’Argentre´, Collectio
judiciorum de novis erroribus, vol. 1/2 (Paris, 1728), fol. 75a–129a, esp. fol. 128b; and
Jean Gerson, Octo regulae super stylo theologico, in Oeuvres comple`tes, ed. P. Glorieux,
vol. 10 (Paris: Descle´e & Cie, 1973), pp. 256–60, 259 (written at Constance before
May 15, 1416): “Et ideo si una assertio habeat unum sensum erroneum, scandalosum
aut piarum aurium offensivum, potest rationabiliter condemnari, non obstante quod
de virtute sermonis grammaticalis aut ex vi vocis logicalis, ipsa habere posset aliquem
sensum verum.” For a discussion of the views of Peter of Ailly and Jean Gerson, see
Z. Kaluza, “Le chancelier Gerson et Je´roˆme de Prague,” Archives d’Histoire Doctri-
nale et Litte´raire du Moyen Age 59 (1984): 81–126; and Kaluza, “Les sciences et leurs
langages,” pp. 223–54.
12. Cf. H. G. Gelber, “Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic
Thought, 1300–1335” (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1974); A. Maieru`, “A
propos de la doctrine de la supposition en the´ologie trinitaire au XIVe sie`cle,” in
Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics, ed. E. P. Bos (Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers,
1985), pp. 221–38; S. Ebbesen. “The Semantics of the Trinity According to Stephen
Langton and Andrew Sunesen,” in Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains. Aux origines de
la Logica Modernorum, ed. J. Jolivet and A. de Libera (Napels: Bibliopolis, 1987), 401–
435; A. Maieru`, “Logica e teologia trinitaria nel commento alle Sentenze attribuito
a Petrus Thomae,” in Lectionum varietates. Hommage a` Paul Vignaux (1904–1987), ed.
J. Jolivet, Z. Kaluza, and A. de Libera (Paris: Vrin, 1991), pp. 177–98 and his essays
quoted at 186f.
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distinction between the divine persons is finite, infinite, or neither of the two.
In both cases, I will demonstrate that, using the logical analysis of the virtue
of speech, Marsilius came to conclusions opposed to those of the ordinary
language.
Before discussing these passages, however, it is important to explain
Marsilius’s trinitarian doctrine, since it is the theological definition of the
Trinity that lies at the bottom of his logical expositions.13
Marsilius shared the traditional notion that the three divine persons are
the same as the divine essence really (realiter) and according to their being
(entitative), since the essence of all three persons is identical and only one.
This means that each person is really in the other person: the Father is really
in the Son and the Holy Ghost, the Son is really in the Father and the Holy
Ghost, and the Holy Ghost is really in the Father and the Son.14 The unity of
the divine essence notwithstanding, the three persons are also distinct. It is
the Father who begets, the Son who is begotten, and the Holy Ghost which
proceeds, according to the definition of the Fourth Lateran Council. Each
person has its own property, which is not shared by the others. Therefore,
there is a real distinction among the three divine persons. In short, the three
persons are really identical according to their essence, but they are really
distinct according to their properties.15 This leaves one with the distinction
between the property and the essence of a person. Although this distinction
was not dogmatically defined, many theologians thought of the property
and the essence as being formally distinct. That is, they are really the same
thing but share different predicates. Therefore, they are neither completely
identical nor completely distinct, but something in between, a distinction
that was considered to be formal.16
13. For a discussion of his trinitarian doctrine, see W. Mo¨hler, Die Trinita¨tslehre
des Marsilius von Inghen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theologie des Spa¨tmittelalters
(Limburg: Lahn-Verlag, 1949).
14. Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones Super quattuor libros Sententiarum (Strasbourg,
1501/Frankfurt: Minerva, 1966), Lib. 1, q. 22, a. 2, concl. 2, fol. 91va: “Per viam cir-
cuminsessionis quaelibet divina persona est realiter et entitative in qualibet divina
persona.” Marsilius derived his notion of ‘circuminsessio’ or ‘circumincessio’ (peri-
choresis) mainly from John Damascene. See John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, ed.
E. M. Buytaert (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1955), cap. 8, 45 (Burgundionis versio).
15. Marsilius, Quaestiones, q. 6, a. 1, concl. 1-2, fol. 37rb. Cf. Kompendium
der Glaubensbekenntnisse und kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen, ed. H. Denzinger and
P. Hu¨nermann, 37th ed. (Freiburg: Herder, 1991), n. 804, 360 (Concilium Late-
ranense IV). The relevant passage from the Lateran Council was included in the De-
cretales Gregorii. See E. Friedberg, ed.,Corpus Iuris Canonici, Pars 2 (Leipzig: Tauchnitz,
1881), 6f. (Decretales Gregorii PP. IX, Lib. I, tit. 1, cap. 2).
16. Marsilius, Quaestiones, q. 22, ad rationes contra quaesitum 1 and 2, fol. 92va–
b. Marsilius is quoting here from Thomas of Strasbourg’s Sentences commentary
(Lib. 1, dist. 19, q. 1, ed. [Venice, 1564], fol. 77rb). See also Marsilius, Quaestiones,
dist. 6, a. 2, concl. 4, fol. 39ra, where he defines the formal distiction as follows:
“suppono quod in proposito dico distingui formaliter illas res quarum una est res
absoluta vel relata et alia non est illa.” A similar definition appears at q. 36, a. 2,
concl. 2, fol. 144vb.
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It goes without saying that against the background of this doctrine
one and the same proposition, let us say p1 ‘The Father and the Son
are identical’, is either true or false according to the meaning of ‘Father’
and ‘Son’. If these terms refer to the essence, p1 is true, because Father and
Son share the same divine essence. However, if they refer to the personal
properties, then p1 is false. For that which begets cannot be identical to that
which is begotten. It is this ambiguity, rooted in the doctrinal complexity of
the Trinity, that required a logical analysis of the propositions involved.
The first passage I will discuss will deepen one’s understanding of how
Marsilius used virtus sermonis and how it was opposed to ordinary speech.
At stake was the identity between the divine persons and their properties,
such as that between Father (pater) and Paternity (paternitas). Paternity is the
property of the Father that makes the Father to be the Father. The person
and the property are in no way really distinct. Father and Paternity are the
same thing (res). Marsilius was of the opinion—one shared by many of his
contemporaries—that the properties of the divine persons are the same as
the persons themselves.17
Yet there is a problem as far as predication is concerned. For there
are predicates that can be asserted of the one but not of the other, at least
not according to ordinary and traditional speech. The predicate ‘begets
the Son’ is affirmed of the Father but not of Paternity. The proposition
p2: ‘The Father begets the Son’ is in agreement with conventional usage.
The proposition p3: ‘Paternity begets the Son’ is not. It is never expressed
in traditional speech.18 This seems to indicate—as an anonymous oppo-
nent cited by Marsilius claimed—that there really is a distinction between
the Father and Paternity, and that the two therefore are not one and the
same.19
At this point, Marsilius begins his analysis. He disagrees with his op-
ponent, arguing that the Father and Paternity really are identical in all
respects.20 The distinction between the predicates is not caused by real dif-
ferences to which the terms Father and Paternity refer; rather, it is found in
the different ways these two terms signify. Father is a concrete term, whereas
Paternity is an abstract one. Abstract terms signify as a form, and because ac-
tions like begetting are not affirmed of the form but only of the individual as
17. Marsilius, Quaestiones, q. 36, a. 1, concl. 5, fol. 144ra–b: “proprietas relativa
est etiam ipsa persona.”
18. Marsilius, Quaestiones, q. 36, ad quartam rationem principalem, fol. 146rb:
“non est proprie locutio ‘paternitas generat’. Cf also Marsilius, Questiones, fol. 146vb:
“videtur Magister Thomas <de Argentina> concedere quod Pater essentia distin-
guatur a Filio inquantum consideratur ut paternitas, quae satis est inusitata et quam
beatus Augustinus et doctores sancti non concesserunt.”
19. Marsilius, Quaestiones, q. 36, ad quartam rationem principalem, fol. 143ra
(quarto).
20. Marsilius, Quaestiones, q. 36, ad quartam rationem principalem, fol. 146rb
(ad quartum).
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a whole (to act the form must exist in the individual), the predicate “begets
the Son” is not affirmed of the subject Paternity.21
In this case, the truth value of propositions like p2 and p3 was ascer-
tained by considering the signification or modus significandi of the subject
term, not by determining the identity or non-identity of that which subject
and predicate stand for (as would have been done in agreement with the
virtue of speech). According to Marsilius, this way of analyzing is dependent
on ordinary speech, the usus loquendi consuetus vulgo, which attributes actions
only to individuals and which has always been followed by the doctors of the
church as the most appropriate way. This is the reason why, traditionally, it
has been denied that Paternity begets the Son.22
Against this traditional view Marsilius put forward another interpreta-
tion of the problem, which came to the opposite conclusion and claimed
that the proposition p3, ‘Paternity begets the Son’, was as true as the propo-
sition p2, ‘The Father begets the Son’. In this case, the question was not
answered according to ordinary language (usus loquendi), but in agreement
with the virtue of speech (de vi sermonis). It was not the signification of the
terms that needed to be considered, but the supposition. In both proposi-
tions, the suppositum of the subject and predicate is one and the same thing.
The terms Father and Paternity stand for the same reality. Therefore, they can
have the same predicates. If the Father begets the Son, then so does Pater-
nity, since the Father is all that which Paternity is. Consequently, proposition
p3, ‘Paternity begets the Son’, is equally true as proposition p2,‘The Father
begets the Son’, according to the virtue of speech.23
As is evident, Marsilius understood the virtue of speech to be deter-
mined by the personal supposition of the terms of the proposition and not
21. Marsilius, Quaestiones, q. 36, ad quartam rationem principalem, fol. 146rb
(ad quartum): “quamvis aliqui termini pro eodem supponant, tamen stat quod
propter diversum modum significandi diversas habeant et suscipiant praedicationes.
Modo, quia quamvis paternitas sit suppositum, tamen quia est nomen abstractum sig-
nificans per modum formae, cui actiones in divinis non attribuimus, sed suppositis,
ideo non est proprie locutio, ‘Paternitas generat’.” Concerning the notion of modus
significandi or modus significationis in Marsilius, see Marsilius of Inghen, Treatises on
the Properties of Terms, pp. 52, 64, 80, 194f.
22. Marsilius, Questiones, q. 36, ad quartam rationem principalem, fol. 146rb (ad
quartum): “doctores fortassis nolunt quod ea (sc. vi sermonis) utamur, sed potius
attribuamus actiones suppositis, quia indignum est de illa maiestate de qua nil digni
eloqui potest uti sermonibus minus aptis, quamvis veris de vi sermonis. Sed eandem
veritatem quantum possumus aptioribus verbis exprimere debemus. Eodem modo,
quod quia filiatio est Filius, verum est quod filiatio sit incarnata de vi sermonis,
sed non est consueta, sed et impropria, quia in huiusmodi locutionibus agere vel
habitudo activa vel passiva additur relationi et exprimitur sub nomine formae, ut
dictum est et ideo quamvis verae sint propter identitatem proprietatis ad suppositum
non utendum est ipsis, quia ineptae sunt.”
23. Ibid., fol. 146rb (ad quartum): “res quae est paternitas generat, quia Pater
generat, et Pater est ibi omne quod est paternitas.” and ibid.: “de vi sermonis meo
iudicio sit vera <‘Paternitas generat’>.”
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by any other supposition or by the intention of the author. His interpretation
agrees with the opinion put forward in the Quaestiones Elenchorum of John
Buridan and with the view criticized in the famous 1340 Statute of the
Parisian Arts Faculty (the so-called Nominalist-Statute).24 The Statute of
1340 repudiated the notion that the virtue of speech was based on the per-
sonal supposition of the terms. Rather, it argued that it should be consid-
ered as originating in the intention of the author and the subject matter
discussed.25
Marsilius did not agree with the definition of the virtue of speech put
forward by the authors of the statute. Yet he sided with their moral concerns.
The statute expressed the view that the use of logic could be offensive to tra-
dition and obliterate its proper understanding.26 In the example discussed,
Marsilius showed the same concern. He contrasted the virtue of speech with
ordinary language, as we have seen, but eventually he sided not with the
truth of the virtue of speech but with that of ordinary language. His final
move was not determined by any imperfections of logic, but, as he pointed
out, by respect for the divine and the human shortcomings discussing the
divine, which would make it better and wiser to join traditional speech and
not to use language which was uncommon and inappropriate, even though
true by the rules of logic (quamvis vera de vi sermonis).27
24. Cf. Johannes Buridanus, Questiones Elencorum, ed. R. van der Lecq and
H. A. G. Braakhuis (Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers, 1994), pp. xix–xxx.
25. H. Denifle and E´. Chaˆtelain, eds., Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, vol. 2
(Paris: Delalain, 1891), n. 1042, pp. 505–7: “quod nulli magistri, baccalarii, vel sco-
lares in artium facultate legentes Parisius audeant aliquam propositionem famosam
illius actoris cujus librum legunt, dicere simpliciter esse falsam, vel esse falsam de vir-
tute sermonis, si crediderint quod actor ponendo illam habuerit verum intellectum;
sed vel concedant eam, vel sensum verum dividant a sensu falso, quia pari ratione
propositiones Biblie absoluto sermone essent negande, quod est periculosum. Et
quia sermo non habet virtutem, nisi ex impositione et usu communi actorum vel
aliorum, ideo talis est virtus sermonis, qualiter eo actores communiter utuntur et
qualem exigit materia, cum sermones sint recipiendi penes materiam subjectam.
Item, quod nullus dicat simpliciter vel de virtute sermonis omnem propositionem
esse falsam, que esset falsa secundum suppositionem personalem terminorum, eo
quod iste error ducit ad priorem errorem, actores enim sepe utuntur aliis supposi-
tionibus.”
26. See fn. 25. For a discussion of this aspect, see Kaluza, “Les sciences et leurs
langages,” pp. 223–58.
27. See fn. 22. On other occasions in his commentary on the Sentences, Marsilius
accepts the definition of virtue of speech based on the suppositio personalis only with
reservations, although he considers it as logically sound and in agreement with the
rules of the disputation. See, e.g., Marsilius, Questiones, q. 24, a. 2, fol. 100va: “Et ita
crederem in consimilibus esse dicendum, quae magis sunt curiosa quam fructuosa,
nisi in disputatione occurrerent, ubi vim sermonis oporteret recitare.” and Marsilius,
Questiones, fol. 101va: “Verum secundum hunc modum loquendi (sc. secundum vir-
tutem sermonis) conceditur quod Pater vel Spiritus Sanctus sit tantum Deus, quia
uterque eorum est non alterius naturae quam divinae, cum non assumpserit aliam.
Hoc de secundo articulo, quia iuxta hoc studiosus scholaris poterit se de talibus
quaestionibus plus scrupulosis quam fructuosis aliqualiter expedire.”
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The Statute of 1340 was issued by the Arts Faculty. The theological
counterpart of the moral considerations of the statute was expressed by the
University of Paris in the already mentioned Tractatus ex parte universitatis two
generations later. Written as part of the trial of Johannes de Montesono,
this treatise defended the view that offensive opinions were rightly to be
condemned, even if they had a true reading according to the virtue of
speech.28
The masters of the Theological Faculty of Paris acquired a growing
reputation as the most important guardians of Christian orthodoxy, a repu-
tation that was confirmed and skillfully used in the political arena by Peter
of Ailly and John Gerson.29 The doctrinal developments in the late medieval
period cannot properly be understood without acknowledging the prestige
of Paris, which played a decisive role in the condemnations at the Coun-
cil of Constance, where Gerson placed the opposition between ordinary
language and logical truth on the agenda, condemning the logical force of
words (vis vocis logicalis) whenever it conflicted with common understanding
(communis modus intelligendi).30
Marsilius’s position was in accordance with this judgment regarding
the logical force of words, although he did not condemn it, but only dis-
approved of it.31 The second example that I will discuss demonstrates this
same attitude. Here, Marsilius was concerned with determining the distinc-
tion between the persons against the background of the divine unity. In
his opinion, two positions were possible. Considering that the distinction
between the divine persons is really the same as the divine persons them-
selves and that the divine persons are really the same as the divine essence
which is infinite, the distinction must be maximal and as infinite as both
the divine essence and the divine persons. On the other hand, the divine
28. Peter of Ailly, Tractatus ex parte universitatis, fol. 128b.
29. This understanding of the theological faculty is apparent from Dean of the
Faculty Rudolphus Glachardus’s 1387 speech. Cf. H. Denifle and E´. Chaˆtelain, eds.,
Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, vol. 3 (Paris: Delalain, 1894), n. 1557, pp. 487–
89. On Gerson’s politics, see G. H. M. Posthumus Meyjes, Jean Gerson, Apostle of Unity:
His Church Politics and Ecclesiology (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999).
30. Cf. Jean Gerson, Sermon prosperum iter, in Oeuvres comple`tes, ed. P. Glorieux,
vol. 5 (Paris: Descle´e et Cie, 1963), pp. 471–80, esp. 476 (written at Constance 1415):
“Tertia directio (sc. salutaris in via catholicae veritatis). Concilium generale potest
damnare propositiones multas cum suis auctoribus licet habere glossas aliquas vel
expositiones vel sensus logicales veros possint. Hoc practicatum est in hoc concilio
de multis articulis Wiclef et Joannis Hus. . . .” and Gerson, Octo Regulae super stylo
theologico, 258f.
31. However, Marsilius was aware of the heretical potential when using the virtue
of speech in theology. See Marsilius, Quaestiones, Lib. 1, q. 24, a. 2, fol 101rb: “Quamvis
ergo de vi strictae locutionis talis (sc. ‘Filius est tantum deus’) sit vera, quia tamen ea
usi sunt haeretici, ut li ‘tantum’ excluderet humanitatem et sic faciat sensum falsum
quem generare posset in simplicibus, ideo tutius est eam non concedere, ne erroris
occasio simus. Ideoque etiam doctores nostri eam non admittunt, ne intelligatur
male.”
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unity is perfect, and it is impossible to think of a greater unity than that of
God. This means that the distinction between the divine persons must be
minimal and not maximal and infinite.32
Marsilius described each position by a set of separate statements (con-
clusiones) in order to show the opposition between the two.33 He also
made clear where exactly the difference between the two came from. The
first position concentrated on the virtue of speech and therefore consid-
ered only the thing for which the term ‘distinction’ stands, whereas the
second was instead concerned with the formal ratio of the distinction
itself.34
The position that was not concerned with the virtue of speech was de-
scribed as the alius modus dicendi.35 Unfortunately, Marsilius does not give
us any information on who defended such an ‘other way of speaking’, but
judging from the first example we have discussed, it seems natural to assume
that he meant once more the traditional way of dealing with the problem.
That this assumption is indeed correct is evident from a passage by Robert
Holcot, which deals with the same problem. Holcot discussed this issue in
the first book of his commentary on the Sentences, from the same perspective
though much more briefly than Marsilius, maintaining that there were two
possible positions in answering the question.36 According to his view, it can
be argued that the distinction between the persons is infinite, because the
distinction between them is the same thing as the divine essence, which is
infinite. Yet, according to the doctors of the Church, the truth of propo-
sition p4, ‘The distinction between the persons is infinite’, does not allow
32. Marsilius, Quaestiones, q. 37, fol. 147vb–148ra (secundo principaliter) and
a. 1, fol. 148ra–149ra.
33. Marsilius, Quaestiones, q. 37, fol. 147vb–148ra (secundo principaliter) and
a. 1, fol. 148ra–149ra.
34. Marsilius, Quaestiones, fol. 148va–vb: “Haec omnia (sc. conclusiones praece-
dentes) de vi significationis terminorum sunt vera, eo quod distinctio personae
est persona et ideo est tanta quanta est persona. . . . Sed ad modum loquendi alium est
dubitatio utrum distinctio Patris a Filio inquantum est distinctio, scilicet secundum
formalem rationem distinctionis, sit finita vel infinita. . . . Et manifestum est quod
secundum talem modum loquendi haec consequentia non valet: ‘infinita distinctio
est Patris a Filio, ergo Pater infinite distinguitur a Filio’.”
35. See fn. 34.
36. Robert Holcot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, (1518; Frankfurt:
Minerva, 1967), Lib. 1, q. 5, fol. e8va (argumentum secundum) and fol. f1va–b
(ad secundum). Marsilius was familiar with Holcot’s Sentences commentary, which
he quoted in his own commentary and of which he had a copy in his personal li-
brary. See G. To¨pke, Die Matrikel der Universita¨t Heidelberg von 1386 bis 1662, vol. 1
(Heidelberg: Winter, 1884), pp. 678–85, esp. 679: “Item (414.) Holkot super senten-
cias.” As to Marsilius’s library, see D. Walz, “Marsilius von Inghen als Schreiber und
Bu¨chersammler,” in Marsilius von Inghen, Werk und Wirkung. Akten des Zweiten Interna-
tionalen Marsilius-von-Inghen-Kongresses, ed. S. Wielgus (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw
Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1993), pp. 31–71.
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one to conclude that the persons are infinitely distinct, since the distinction
between them must be infinitely smaller than any possible distinction be-
tween creatures.37
In his treatment, Holcot described the same two positions, but without
offering a deep analysis of their differences and without using the concept
of virtue of speech. Still, his discussion is important for our understanding
of Marsilius. Holcot attributed the view that the distinction between the
persons is minimal to the common tradition of the doctors of the Church:
“solet dici a doctoribus quod distinctio personalis est minima.”38 He thereby offers
us important information on the view that Marsilius labelled as the ‘alius
modus dicendi’: the ‘other way of speaking’ and the alternative to the virtue
of speech was tradition.
The same evidence can also be drawn from a number of remarks by
Adam Wodeham, who analyzed this problem in his Ordinatio Oxoniensis more
elaborately than Holcot. His treatment of the issue comes close to Marsilius’s
own. He also offered a list of separate statements, some of which reappeared
in Marsilius. From this and other passages it is clear that Marsilius had the
Ordinatio of Wodeham or rather its Abbreviatio by Henry of Oyta at his desk
when composing his commentary.39
Wodeham distinguished between common language (vulgatus modus
loquendi or usualis locutio) and virtue of speech (vis vocis). According to com-
mon language, it is impossible to think of any distinction smaller than that
between the divine persons as they coincide in the unity of divine nature. The
distinction is therefore minimal. But this approach did not satisfy Wodeham,
who found that the distinction between the divine persons was identical with
the persons themselves and was therefore infinite, as the persons themselves.
37. Holcot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, fol. f1vb: “posset dici quod
Pater distinguitur a Filio distinctione infinita, quia seipso, qui est infinitus. Similiter,
ista distinctio est essentia divina, et per consequens infinita. . . . Solet dici a doctoribus
quod distinctio personalis est minima, nec est comparabilis alicui distinctioni inter
creaturas vel inter res distinctas essentialiter. Et ideo in infinitum minus distinguun-
tur Pater et Filius quam Sortes et Plato.”
38. See fn. 37.
39. Compare Adam Wodeham, Ordinatio Oxoniensis (Abbreviatio Henrici de Oyta)
(Paris, 1512), Lib. 1, dist. 33, q. 8, fol. q6rb–vb (ad primum principale) and Marsilius,
Quaestiones, Lib. 1, q. 37, a. 1, fol. 148rb–149ra. For the use of Wodeham by Marsilius,
see Mo¨hler, Die Trinita¨tslehre des Marsilius von Inghen, p. 128; and Hoenen, Marsilius
of Inghen, pp. 57–60, 232f. For a listing of the questions discussed in the different
versions of Adam Wodeham’s commentary on the Sentences and in the Abbreviatio
by Henry of Oyta, see W. J. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, An Introduction to his Life
and Writings (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978), pp. 183–234. According to M. Santos, “Die
‘auctoritates theologicae’ im Sentenzenkommentar des Marsilius von Inghen,” in
Philosophie und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters. Marsilius von Inghen und das Denken
seiner Zeit, ed. M. J. F. M. Hoenen and P. J. J. M. Bakker (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000),
pp. 197–210, esp. 209, Marsilius used, most probably, Henry of Oyta’s Abbreviatio.
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It is not minimal, but maximal, because a greater distinction cannot be
conceived.40
This second approach, which arrived at conclusions contrary to those
of the first, was based on the virtue of speech. Wodeham distinctly preferred
it.41 On this point, he was much clearer than Holcot. But besides this dif-
ferent evaluation by the two authors, their presentation and their manner
of dealing with the issue were similar: both mentioned two different ap-
proaches, one of which was according to the customary way of speaking,
the other not. The customary approach was exactly the same as the alius
modus dicendi that Marsilius opposed to the virtue of speech. This confirms
the evidence found in Holcot regarding the background of the alius modus
dicendi—this was indeed the approach of tradition.
I will now return to the exposition of Marsilius. Although he discusses
both approaches, that of tradition and that of the virtue of speech, he does
not openly say which of the two he prefers. Although his silence stands
in contrast to the first example, where he clearly sided with tradition, one
can conclude from the way in which his argument is arranged that the
same preference must be at play here. For he begins his treatment with
an analysis of the problem according to the virtue of speech, then changes
the perspective and concludes with the traditional argument. For Marsilius,
tradition must have the last word.42
This raises the question of why Marsilius discussed the virtue of speech
approach at all, if he was going to choose tradition anyway. There are several
possible answers. The first has to do with his background. Marsilius was a
professional logician, and thus naturally interested in logical problems.43
The second concerns the design of his commentary on the Sentences. It
contains many quotations from other works, some of which are followed
closely in the structure of the questions, the result being that many problems
40. Adam Wodeham, Ordinatio Oxoniensis, fol. q6va: “Secundo sequitur quod
haec distinctio (sc. inter personas) sit infinita, quia quaelibet persona divina est
infinita. . . . Quinto sequitur quod ad vim vocis omnia sequentia de hoc puncto
falsa sunt, cum dicitur quod ista distinctio est in infinitum minor omni distinctione
essentiali creaturae a creatura vel Dei a creatura vel econtra. Haec (sc. praecedentia)
sunt dicta ad vim vocis. Sed ad usualem intellectum dicendum est longe aliter. . . .
Ideo ad usualem locutionem dici potest quod nulla potest excogitari minor distinctio
quam sit ista.”
41. Wodeham, Ordinatio Oxoniensis, fol. q6rb–va.
42. That there is a possible conflict between tradition and virtue of speech was
also noted in Ockham, Tractatus de quantitate, ed. C. A. Grassi (St. Bonaventure, NY:
St. Bonaventure University, 1986), q. 3, 69: “Nec est inconveniens exponere dicta
Sanctorum, cum multa dicta etiam Sacrae Scripturae indigeant expositione, quia
multa non sunt vera secundum proprietatem sermonis, quamvis secundum sensum,
quem debemus habere, sint verissima.” Like Marsilius, Ockham distinguished be-
tween virtus sermonis and intentio auctoris. See also Ockham, Tractatus de quantitate,
q. 1, 30f., 35, 45.
43. Some of Marsilius’s logical writings are edited by E. P. Bos in Marsilius of
Inghen: Treatises on the Properties of Terms. A First Critical Edition.
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discussed in these sources are adopted into the discussion. This is certainly
the case in the second example mentioned above, where Marsilius was
partly inspired by Adam Wodeham. One can also assume that Marsilius in-
cluded other materials in his commentary, such as university disputations, a
phenomenon known from many other fourteenth-century commentaries
on the Sentences.44 Interestingly, on one occasion in his discussion of the
Trinity, Marsilius remarked that in disputations, the virtue of speech must
be followed.45 This may explain why in the second example Marsilius dis-
cussed the virtue of speech approach in detail. He had possibly treated it in a
disputation secundum vim sermonis and subsequently adopted this treatment
into his commentary. Finally, there is a third answer, which puts the first two
into the broader perspective of Marsilius’s thought. Repeatedly in his com-
mentary on the Sentences, Marsilius exhibited some reserve concerning the
uncontrolled use of logic in theology, especially when it led to embarrass-
ing conclusions such as God being the cause of evil. Generally, he also had
the same attitude toward philosophy whenever it was not guided by divine
revelation. In his treatment of creation, he explained that philosophy and
theology were diametrically opposed over this question. Both had their own
principles and methodology and therefore reached contradictory conclu-
sions regarding creation. Importantly, Marsilius showed exactly how and why
they generated opposing results.46 He analyzed their different modi proce-
dendi, as we have seen in the case of two examples discussed above. Marsilius
not only opposed the two different approaches, that is, that of tradition and
that of the virtue of speech, but he also examined the logical and semantic
nature of their differences. On this point, he went significantly further than
either Robert Holcot or Adam Wodeham.
In the late medieval period, one witnesses a strong tendency toward
traditionalism, in the wake of which, the use of logic in theology as developed
in the first half of the fourteenth century became the target of criticism.
There was a growing sense that theology and logic pursued different aims
by means of different methods and that theology as the ‘scientia pietatis’
44. For examples, see K. Michalski, Histoire de la Philosophie (Cracow: Insty-
tut Teologiczny Ksiezy Misjonarzy, 1999), pp. 59–95 (“Die vielfachen Redaktionen
einiger Kommentare zu Petrus Lombardus,” which is still very interesting, but unfor-
tunately printed with many typographical errors) and 158 (Hartmannus, Sentences
commentary, Cracow, BJ 1276, fol. 17r: ‘Ista quaestio collecta est de diversis disputatio-
nibus, quibus in diversis locis interfui’). See also A. D. Trapp, “Augustinian Theology
of the 14th Century. Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions and Book-Lore,” Au-
gustiniana 6 (1956): 146–274; and V. Marcolino, “Einleitung,” in Gregory of Rimini,
Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum, ed. A. D. Trapp and V. Marcolino, vol. 1
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), pp. xi–ciii, esp. xvf.
45. Cf. Marsilius, Quaestiones, Lib. 1, q. 24, a. 2, fol. 100va: “in disputatione . . . ,
ubi vim sermonis oporteret recitare.” For the complete text, see fn. 27 above.
46. I discussed this point in “Marsilius von Inghen in der Geistesgeschichte des
14. und 15. Jahrhunderts,” in Philosophie und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters,
pp. 21–45.
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should follow tradition as approved by the doctors of the Church and not
human logic, since the latter could lead to superstition and errors.47 In
this development, the notion of virtue of speech was of central importance.
It was linked to the concept of language—which could be true according
to the rules of human logic and at the same time contradict tradition or
the communis opinio theologorum and therefore needed to be condemned. As
such it was used by Peter of Ailly and John Gerson in their description of
the nature of theology.48
The two examples I have discussed demonstrate that Marsilius was in
line with Peter of Ailly and John Gerson. Marsilius studied theology at Paris
and was still sensitive to the Parisian intellectual atmosphere when he pre-
pared his lectures on the Sentences as rector at Heidelberg.49 Yet he did not
simply follow the Parisian trend. He contributed to it by analyzing the dif-
ference between tradition and the virtue of speech from his perspective as
a theologian trained in logic, thus giving modern readers a better insight
into the complex background of the debate.
Marsilius emphasized the distinction between divinely inspired theol-
ogy and human philosophy. Here again he shared the views of Peter of Ailly
and Gerson who claimed, in accordance with the Statute of 1340 that every
science has its own methodology (modus procedendi or stylus), dependent on
the subject matter (materia subiecta).50 The distinction between theology and
philosophy became an issue in the debates between nominalists and realists
in the Wegestreit of the fifteenth century.51 Gerson justifiedthecondemnation
47. Cf. Z. Kaluza, “Bulletin d’histoire des doctrines me´die´vales. Les XIVe et XVe
sie`cles,” Revue des sciences philosophiques et the´ologiques 79 (1995): 111–59, esp. 150f.
48. Cf. W. Hu¨bener, “Der theologisch-philosophische Konservatismus des Jean
Gerson,” in Antiqui and Moderni. Traditionsbewußtsein und Fortschrittsbewußtsein im
spa¨ten Mittelalter, ed. A. Zimmermann (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1974), pp. 171–
200, esp. 171–75. See also G. Krieger, “Theologica perscrutatio labi debet ad inflam-
mationem affectus. Der Zusamenhang von mystischer Theologie und Philosophie
bei Johannes Gerson,” in Scientia und ars im Hoch- und Spa¨tmittelalter, ed. I. Craemer-
Ruegenberg and A. Speer, vol. 2 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), pp. 605–19.
49. This is especially clear in the principia to his Sentences commentary. On this,
see my “Neuplatonismus am Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts. Die Prinzipien zum Senten-
zenkommentar des Marsilius von Inghen,” in Marsilius von Inghen, Werk und Wirkung.
Akten des Zweiten Internationalen Marsilius-von-Inghen-Kongresses, ed. S. Wielgus
(Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1993),
pp. 165–94.
50. On the background of the notions of materia subiecta and stylus theologicus, see
Kaluza, “Le Chancelier Gerson,” pp. 90, 108–15 (app. 1); and Kaluza, “Les sciences
et leurs langages,” pp. 238–44.
51. The Realists at Cologne defended the unity of philosophy and theology
against the concerns of the Prince Electors. In a letter to the University of 1425, the
latter showed a preference for the stylus humilior and the modus loquendi of Buridan
and Marsilius as a protection of Faith. See F. Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters
von Candia des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V. Ein Beitrag zur Scheidung der Schulen in
der Scholastik des vierzehnten Jahrhunderts und zur Geschichte des Wegestreites (Mu¨nster
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of the realists John Wyclif and John Hus by claiming that they had ignored
the separation of the sciences and wrongly had used philosophical method-
ology in theology. That there indeed existed a link between Marsilius and
Gerson on this point was noticed by the Masters of Heidelberg in their fa-
mous 1499 defense of nominalism. A fictitious speech attributed to Marsilius
refers to both the views of Gerson and to his criticism of Wyclif and Hus.52
The separation of the sciences as an issue in the Wegestreit deserves more
study. Here again, the works of Marsilius may yield new evidence.
Marsilius of Inghen had an audience and a style of reasoning that dif-
fered from Gerson’s. He stayed within the scope of Scholasticism, being
mainly concerned with the theoretical part of the issues discussed. His treat-
ment of the virtue of speech thus reveals how in Scholastic theology of the
late medieval period, the use of logic became dominated by the pressure
of tradition and the need to keep theory within the limits of the communis
opinio theologorum.
in Westf.: Aschendorff, 1925), pp. 281–85, esp. 282, 284. On the debates between
Realists and Nominalists at Cologne, see G.-R. Tewes, Die Bursen der Ko¨lner Artisten-
Fakulta¨t bis zur Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts (Ko¨ln: Bo¨hlau, 1993).
52. This fictitious speech is printed in Ad illustrissimum Bavarie ducem Philippum
Comitem Rheni Palatini et ad nobilissimos filios epistola (Mainz: Peter Friedberg, 1499).
The volume also contains an extract from Gerson’s De modis significandi with its sharp
criticism of realism. A new edition is in preparation: Marsilius von Inghen. Zentenar-
Festschrift (1499) zur sechshundertja¨hrigen Wiederkehr des Todestages des ersten Rektors der
Universita¨t Heidelberg am 20. August 1396, ed. R. Du¨chting and D. Walz (Heidelberg,
forthcoming).

